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My paper offers some thoughts in crystal-ball gazing about the future of seabed
mining from an economic, political, and legal point of view.
The present economic environment does not augur well for deep seabed
mining. World demand for the metals is low and prices are depressed. Many land-
based mines have shut down. Evaluations of the economics of the industry based
on the succession of models from the 1976 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
model to the 1982 Texas University model have progressed from guarded 'opti-
mism to unrestrained pessimism. Yet prosperity, in conjunction with improved
metal prices in an era of stability and confidence, could rapidly change the eco-
nomic future of ocean mining. So could other factors such as lower-cost equip-
ment, higher content of metal in nodules discovered, increased mining and
processing efficiency, and a corresponding reduction of capital and operating costs.
Seabed mining could therefore eventually become a more attractive invest-
ment. However, as long as land-based supplies of nickel, copper, cobalt, and man-
ganese remain plentiful, it is unlikely that seabed extraction of those metals could
be carried out as cheaply or as efficiently. But the date of commencement of
seabed mining will depend as much on the desires of certain countries to have
what they regard as potentially more assured access to strategic metals and on
pressure from developing countries to set in motion the Enterprise, a company
established by the Law of the Sea Convention1 to conduct ocean mining activities.
Now let us look to the political and legal environment within which seabed
mining might develop. I am confident that when deep seabed mining begins it
will take place under the regime established by the LOS Convention. One pur-
pose of the Convention is to establish a regime for deep seabed resources that can
grant exploitation rights which will be recognized by most, if not all, of the world.
When the LOS Convention comes into force, it will establish an International
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Seabed Authority. The Authority will have the power to issue to private or state-
controlled entities mining rights that will be exclusive against all other miners who
satisfy, or are nationals of countries that ratify, the Convention. The Convention
will also establish a company, to be called the Enterprise, that will conduct ocean
mining activities for the benefit of developing countries. This dual system of access
for private miners and for the Enterprise, referred to as the "parallel system,"
forms the basic compromise between the industrialized and developing countries
at the LOS Conference.
II
MINING OUTSIDE THE CONVENTION
Some of those who have ideological objections to the legal regime established
by the Convention have argued that as the high seas are res commun's under inter-
national law, companies should exploit the deep seabed under domestic legislation.
Aside from the fact that the legal premise of this argument is disputed by most of
the world community, pursuing such a course of action has certain practical disad-
vantages. The possibility of disputes over exclusive rights to a mine site, the lack of
agreed provisions for the resolution of such conflicts, and the threat of interna-
tional legal action by parties to the LOS Convention combine with extremely
large capital investment requirements and a long pay-back period to make ocean
mining under domestic law extremely unattractive.
In order to overcome the unattractiveness of mining under domestic legislation,
certain critics of the Convention have argued in favor of establishing a minitreaty
for seabed exploitation. To be really effective, such a treaty would need to include
all potential ocean-mining countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy,
Canada, the USSR, and India) as well as a sufficient number of small industrial-
ized countries and developing states to weaken the support for the Convention.
Participation by fewer countries would leave sufficient opportunity for conflict,
delay, and harassment by parties outside the minitreaty such that banks and large
corporations would find the risks too high to justify the investments required for
commercial-scale operations. Recent attempts to establish a minitreaty have not
been successful. Not one single industrialized country has been willing to go along
with the United States in contravention of the terms of the LOS Convention, even
before it was signed.
As Ambassador Malone has revealed, 2 an attempt to persuade the major indus-
trialized countries not to sign the Convention is at present being undertaken by a
United States mission headed by Donald Rumsfeld. It is my firm belief, however,
that most industrialized countries will sign and eventually ratify the Convention
along with developing countries. The advantages of the nonseabed provisions far
outweigh any apparent disadvantages of the seabed provisions. In my opinion any
country which is a party to the Convention is prohibited by Article 137(3) from
2. See Malone, The United States and the Law ofthe Sea After UNCLOS III, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring, 1983, at 29. Ambassador Malone served as chairman of the U.S. delegation to UNCLOS III.
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recognizing mine site claims of a nonparty to the Convention. Even the recently
concluded conflict resolution agreement between the United States, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France could be short-lived
because settlement of overlapping claims implies a recognition by the parties of
each others' claims, and it will be ultimately impossible for the Federal Republic
of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France to recognize the United States'
claims if they sign and eventually ratify the LOS Convention. Most industrialized
countries, with the exception of the United States, will next year begin partici-
pating in the Preparatory Commission to set up the "rules of the game." This
offers a unique opportunity for the commercial competitors of the United States to
develop rules of access to one of the world's potentially greatest resources of stra-
tegic minerals without necessarily having to take into account the United States'
concerns and interests. It is very saddening to me that the United States, with all
its fine traditions and experience in international lawmaking, will be absent from
the important work of the Preparatory Commission.
Even in the absence of a minitreaty, it is within the capacity of a fertile mind to
contemplate the United States "going it alone"-instituting a program of govern-
ment-backed political risk insurance to eliminate the risks to investment in ocean
mining and in other activities in foreign countries. This would, of course, require
the United States government to abandon those very same free-market principles
to which it subordinated the advantages of joining the Convention. In addition,
the United States government would have to ensure that investors would not suffer
due to conflicts over mine sites claims by Convention operators. In the event of a
conflict of claims between an operator operating under United States domestic law
and another operator operating under the Convention, it would be little use for
the United States to go to the International Court of Justice on behalf of its oper-
ator because it would seem clear that the court would back the operator operating
under the Convention. Short of the costly and desperate alternative of employing
its Navy to protect the operator on a continuing basis, thus risking armed conflict
with its traditional allies, the United States could become embroiled in a sanctions
game against European and Japanese companies which would make the recent gas
pipeline dispute look like a sparring match. I can only hope that those of us who
are aghast at the thought of such a scenario and who value the United States
becoming a party to the Convention will work at the Preparatory Commission
towards developing rules and regulations attractive enough to induce a future U.S.
administration and Senate to agree to the United States becoming a party.
III
THE PARALLEL SYSTEM
If seabed mining is to take place under the legal regime set up by the LOS
Convention, it is appropriate to ask whether this regime will encourage or dis-
courage seabed mining. One has to look at this from the two sides of the parallel
system-the Enterprise on the one hand and states and companies on the other.
As far as the Enterprise is concerned, the prospects would seem quite rosy. It
will have prospected sites offered to it upon which considerable research and devel-
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opment have been expended. It could have as startup capital as much as half the
cost of an integrated mining, transportation, and processing project as well as
guaranteed loans for the same amount. If the United States were not to become a
party to the Convention, the total funds available to the Enterprise would be
reduced by approximately one quarter. It would still be left with a tidy sum to
commence mining operations on at least two sites, having purchased the tech-
nology to do the same, or to go into a joint venture in an integrated project with a
state or company from the other side of the parallel system. In addition, it will
have priority with respect to being granted production authorization. The only
problem is that the Enterprise will not get its site until a license is granted to an
entity on the other side of the parallel system. However, with the political pressure
to get the Enterprise functioning at an early stage, the directors of the Enterprise
will at least in the initial stages be doing their utmost to encourage activities on the
other side of the parallel system.
As far as the corporation working on the other side of the parallel is concerned,
the Convention offers widely-accepted exploitation rights and orderly resolution of
conflicting claims, thus facilitating planning and capital-raising activities. Fur-
thermore, as the terms of the contract are written into the Convention itself, the
miner will not be faced with the prospect of forced renegotiation or expropriation
that he sometimes finds with his land-based activities today.
There are of course some provisions in the Convention that do impose financial
burdens and have elements of uncertainty in their application. But I agree with
the views of two United States authors3 in a recent article entitled "Incentives for
Ocean Mining under the New Law of the Sea. ' '4 These authors, who incidentally
have been longstanding members of the U.S. LOS delegations, argue forcefully
that the disincentives to seabed mining are more apparent than real and from a
commercial point of view might not warrant the political controversy that has
been caused from leaving these provisions in the Convention. This is particularly
so given the mitigating effects of a resolution on protection of pioneer investment
to which I shall refer below.
The authors point out that even the practical effects of the most controversial
provisions for the sale of technology from the private miner to the Enterprise and
to developing states would entail little cost to the miner. The authors cite a
number of reasons for this, the principal one being that the sale of technology may
be required only if such technology is not available on the open market. A recent
contract study by the U.S. Department of the Interior indicates that there are at
least four suppliers for every component of an ocean mining system and for the
design and construction of the system itself.5
Much has been said about the magnitude of payments made under the Con-
3. Lance N. Antrim, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress; James K. Sebenius, Harvard
University.
4. Antrim & Sebenius, Incentwtes for Ocean Mntng Under the ,Aew Law of the Sea, in LAWX OF rite SEA:
U.S. POLICY DILEMMA 79-99 (1983).
5. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS, INC., ALTERNATIVES FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO "IiE ENTERPRISE
61 (1978) (available from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va.).
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vention, but these are favorably comparable with payments made to developing
countries by investors in land-based mining operations. While the payments will
be substantial, they can be borne by investors in part because of the progressive
tax system established by the Convention. As one of those associated with its
drafting, I would like to think of the system as one of the most sophisticated and
flexible mining tax systems in the world today. In addition, the financial burden
on investors could be substantially reduced if the investor's parent government
allowed all or part of the profit-sharing payments to be credited against its taxes in
the same manner as is common with land-based mining. Alternatively, there are
double taxing agreements of the type which many industrialized countries,
including the United States, have entered into with developing countries. As these
industrialized countries have agreed, in return for assured access to seabed min-
erals, to a system by which the Authority has taxing powers, there is nothing
inconsistent with their entering into double-taxing arrangements with the
Authority.
While many disincentives contained in the provisions are more apparent than
real, much can be done by the Preparatory Commission to clarify definitions and
terms and remove uncertainties that can go a long way towards stimulating
investor confidence in seabed mining.
One of the breakthroughs from the private investors' point of view was the
adoption by the LOS Conference of Resolution II, the Protection of Pioneer Inves-
tors. The purpose of the resolution was to provide the stability and certainty nec-
essary to encourage continuation of development activities already underway.
This resolution attempts to reduce investor uncertainty through the recognition of
the exclusive right to explore a mine site and the assurance of a contract to exploit
the mine site once the Convention comes into force.
The four multinational consortia which may register as pioneer investors have
partners which are incorporated in the United States. Were the United States to
remain outside the Convention, it would be necessary for the consortia, if they
were registered as pioneer investors, either to incorporate themselves outside the
United States or else ensure that their U.S. partners changed their places of incor-
poration if they were to receive licenses to exploit their mine sites.
IV
JOINT VENTURES
We have examined the scenario from both sides of the parallel system. How-
ever, seabed mining under the Convention must be looked at in its totality with
the parallel system as an interdependent one. I have always regarded the parallel
system with the Kissinger proposals for the financing of the Enterprise and the
transfer of technology thereto as an ingenious political compromise-a theoretical
system that nearly everyone playing the negotiating game was aware might easily
not turn out quite that way in practice. Fortunately, enough flexibility was
allowed in the system to permit each side of the system, states and nationals on the
one hand and the Enterprise on the other, having obtained rights to work their
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sites individually, to go into joint ventures. I am convinced that future seabed
mining under the Convention will be predominantly by joint-venture activity.
In forming joint ventures, private firms may avail themselves of some of the
advantages of the Enterprise. The terms of the joint venture would be established
by negotiation between the Enterprise and the private firm; but, since there is
always the opportunity to mine under the private system, the terms of the joint
venture must improve on the provisions relating to the parallel system.
There are a number of reasons for the Enterprise to be interested in forming
joint ventures, particularly in the early years under the Convention. I list a few:
(i) political pressure for the Enterprise to begin mining at the same time as the
first miner in the nonrestricted area;
(ii) reduction of the risk of loss of the only investment capital available to the
Enterprise by spreading the risk over several joint ventures with experienced
mining companies; and
(iii) ability to begin operations without a large body of trained personnel.
Private firms will have a number of incentives to choose joint ventures rather
than operate on the private side of the system (and indeed, rather than operate
outside the Convention regime). These include:
(i) access to the investment capital of the Enterprise which, even without
United States contributions, would probably approach $1 billion;
(ii) opportunity to negotiate reduced financial payments to the Authority;
(iii) assurance of the approval of plans of work for the conduct of exploration
and exploitation activities; and




In conclusion, therefore, my predictions are that despite the readily available,
abundant, land-based supplies of nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese at present,
seabed mining for political and strategic reasons alone will get underway when
world economic conditions are favorable. The only workable legal regime gov-
erning seabed mining activities will be that laid down in the LOS Convention and
the rules and regulations of the International Seabed Authority drawn up by the
Preparatory Commission. Any industrialized country with a strategic need for
deep-ocean minerals that remains outside the Convention will do so at the risk of
losing assured and direct access to those minerals.
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